These extremists, sometimes known as “sovereign citizens,” believe they can live outside any type of government authority, FBI agents said at a news conference.

Legal convictions of such extremists, mostly for white-collar crimes such as fraud, have increased from 10 in 2009 to 18 each in 2010 and 2011, FBI agents said.

The Executive branch has an obsession with a tiny percentage of the population in the United States that believes they don’t have to follow any rules. The administration continues to point out these people as a serious threat, while denying any correlation between any terrorist attack and Islam. Where are the FBI warnings of Muslims preaching overthrow of the US government?

By Scott Stewart

Mali has experienced perhaps the most significant external repercussions from the downfall of the regime of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi. Stratfor has discussed the impact of the conflict in Libya on the wider region since international intervention began in March 2011. Instability in Libya due to that country’s deep internal fault lines meant that re-establishing a government would prove difficult. As we pointed out, that instability could spread to neighboring countries as weapons and combatants flow outward from Libya.

Reports now indicate that thousands of armed Tuareg tribesmen who previously served in Gadhafi’s military have returned home to Mali. The influx of this large number of well-armed and well-trained fighters, led by a former Libyan army colonel, has re-energized the long-simmering Tuareg insurgency against the Malian government. These Tuareg insurgents have formed a new group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). In mid-January, they began a military campaign to free three northern regions of Mali from Bamako’s control.

The government of Mali has claimed that the MNLA is aligned with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). MNLA, however, has strongly denied any link to the group and said it will serve as a bulwark against AQIM. Given the U.S. and European interest in preventing the strengthening of AQIM, both sides have considerable incentive to take their respective positions. These developments make it an opportune time to examine the MNLA, its current offensive and the potential implications for Mali and the region.

The Tuaregs and the Origins of the MNLA

The Tuaregs are a semi-nomadic people who inhabit the interior of Africa’s Sahara region, including parts of Mali, Algeria, Niger and Libya. (Click here for background information on the Tuaregs.) Tuareg militancy extends to pre-colonial times; the current conflict is merely the latest manifestation of a longstanding struggle between the Tuaregs and their ruler of the moment. In modern times, Tuareg insurgencies seem to occur almost every decade. They have fought the governments of Mali, Niger and Algeria since those countries’ independence from France. Major Tuareg rebellions occurred in Mali from 2007 to 2009 and from 1990 to 1995.

During these rebellions, Tuareg militants typically exploit their mountain bases in Mali’s northeast to launch hit-and-run guerrilla attacks against military targets across Mali’s vast northern region, leaving the Malian armed forces spread thin.

The Tuaregs are a tribal people. Some Tuareg tribes in Mali — such as the Oulemedens, Ichnidharans and Imgads — tend to be more closely aligned than tribes such as the Idnans, Ifoghas and Chamanesse, which tend to be involved with armed opposition to the government.

Traditionally, the Tuaregs controlled caravan routes across the Sahara. In days past, those caravans carried gold, spices, salt or dates. Today, contraband including weapons, untaxed tobacco and even narcotics traverse the desert routes. Banditry remains common in the region.

The MNLA emerged against this backdrop on Oct. 16, 2011, four days before the killing of Moammar Gadhafi. Its leader is former Libyan army Col. Ag Mohamed Najem, who hails from the Ifogha tribe, at present the most radical tribe of the Tuareg opposition in Mali.

MNLA’s website notes that the group is composed of remnants of former Tuareg opposition movements such as the United Fronts of Azawad, which led the 1990s uprising, and the Tuareg Movement in Northern Mali led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, who spearheaded the 2007-2009 rebellion. A cousin of MNLA leader Ag Mohamed Najem, Ag Bahanga died Aug. 26, 2011, in what some reports call a car accident. Other reports indicate he may have been killed in a strike by a U.S.-trained Malian counterterrorism unit. At the time of his death, he was trying to return to Mali from Libya, where he had fled in 2009 after a failed offensive into southern Mali.

Najem reportedly rose quickly among Gadhafi’s ranks to become colonel of a unit of the Libyan army stationed in Sabha, in central Libya, making him quite familiar with the tactics of desert warfare. He reportedly deserted the Libyan army in July 2011 and, according to media reports, now holds at least two camps in Tigherghar and Zakak in the Tin-Assalak hills of northeast Mali, an area where Ag Bahanga established bases in 2007.

Najem is not the only MNLA leader with significant military experience. Experienced defectors from the Malian army including Lt. Col. Ag Mbarek Aky and Col. Ag Bamoussa reportedly have bolstered the organization. The presence of experienced military leaders gives the MNLA an increased ability to organize and mobilize its units across a broad swath of territory in northern Mali.

According to the group’s website, their long-term demands include the liberation of the Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal regions in northern Mali. Previous Tuareg opposition movements have demanded reforms including decentralization and regional military integration. Notably, the MNLA does not seek control of all of Mali, just the northern regions.

The MNLA’s website also goes to great lengths to distance the MNLA from the Gadhafi regime, but its claims that its Tuareg fighters fought alongside the Libyan rebels against Gadhafi are highly dubious. Indeed, many of Gadhafi’s Tuareg troops supported the regime until his death and the capture of his son Seif al-Islam. But no matter which side they fought on in Libya, the arrival of a large contingent of heavily armed Tuareg fighters (reportedly numbering between 2,000 and 4,000) poses a significant challenge to the government of Mali.

Current MNLA Offensive

On Jan. 16-17, MNLA militants attacked a military barracks and a national guard base in Menaka, Gao region. A government helicopter forced the attackers to retreat. The Malian Defense Ministry stated that one soldier and several assailants were killed, but the actual number of casualties is thought to be higher. According to media reports, Tuareg rebels led by Malian army defector Ag Assalat Habbi may still be in the Menaka area.

On the morning of Jan. 17, the MNLA continued attacks against the northeastern cities of Aguelhoc and Tessalit in Kidal region. Witnesses reported that approximately 20 vehicles drove through the town of Aguelhoc to the military barracks before firing on the army with small arms and heavy weapons. Throughout the clashes there were contradicting claims over who controlled the cities, but by Jan. 20 the Malian government released a statement indicating that the three towns of Menaka, Aguelhoc and Tessalit had been reclaimed, indicating the rebels had held them for at least a short period. As Mali is very large and has poor roads and limited air assets, it can take the Malian military quite some time to reinforce units overland from southern Mali.

The rebels reportedly returned with reinforcements to Aguelhoc and, after cutting off supply convoys for nearly two days, launched an assault on the city early Jan. 24. According to one media account, the army had to abandon Aguelhoc after troops ran out of ammunition; another report says they staged a tactical retreat to reinforce the larger city of Kidal nearby. Following the retreat, the Malian government conducted airstrikes on Aguelhoc using fixed-wing Malian aircraft (likely MiG-21s), reportedly destroying some 40 rebel vehicles and killing dozens of fighters. The MNLA posted a photo on its Facebook page it claims shows a MiG-21 that MNLA forces shot down, but the photo is actually of a destroyed truck. On Jan. 25, government troops recaptured Aguelhoc. Subsequent reports suggest control of Aguelhoc has passed back and forth more than once since then.

The MNLA continued its series of armed assaults Jan. 26 on the towns of Anderamboukane in Gao region and Lere in Timbuktu region. While reports from Anderamboukane, near Menaka, have conflicted — as have almost all reports regarding the fighting in the region — it appears that the rebel assaults were similar to those launched against other towns and that the military used helicopters to disperse the attackers.

Lere, a small town, is approximately 320 kilometers (about 200 miles) west of the towns previously targeted. Local residents reported that MNLA fighters arrived in a dozen cars after a military unit had left the town so the militants faced no resistance. According to Reuters, military reinforcements were deployed in the direction of Lere on Jan. 28, but the present status of the town is unclear. Although tactically simple, this assault displays the geographic reach of the rebel movement and its intent to make government forces deploy across Mali’s expansive north.

Lere is just south of Lake Faguibine, an area frequented by AQIM convoys. In June 2010, a joint Malian-Mauritanian force chased AQIM fighters into the Lere area after it attacked AQIM camps located in Wagadou Forest, on the Mali-Mauritania border.

On Jan. 31, the MNLA also reportedly attacked Niafunke, in Timbuktu region, in the far west of northern Mali. We have also seen an unconfirmed report of a purported MNLA attack in Ntilit, Goa region.

MNLA and AQIM

Mali is poor and its troops are poorly trained and equipped. Historically, the government has not demonstrated the will to seriously tackle Tuareg militants — or AQIM for that matter. As noted above, the influx of thousands of armed Tuareg fighters poses a significant threat to the Malian government’s ability to control the north of the country. The number of Tuareg fighters now reportedly engaged in the insurgency is considerably larger than the number involved in the 2007-2009 uprising. And the MNLA is not the only threat Mali faces. Like other nations in the region, the presence of AQIM threatens Mali, and in recent years the United States, France and the European Union have all provided funding and training intended to assist the government of Mali in countering the AQIM threat. Matters become murky at this point.

The government of Mali has publicly claimed that the MNLA is associated with AQIM to draw even more support from the United States and the Europeans. In fact, if not for the AQIM threat, the Americans and Europeans would not be inclined to pay much attention to the happenings in Mali: The AQIM card is really the only one the Malian government has to play to induce Western involvement. Given the grave Tuareg threat they face, the Malians are attempting to hype the AQIM-Tuareg relationship.

Certainly, U.S. and European air assets could provide a dramatic boost to the efforts of the Malian military, not just in terms of strikes, but also in terms of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Such assets could provide an elevated sense of battlefield awareness that could permit the Malian government to deploy its limited resources in a decisive manner. It could also help them know when not to engage. Likewise, as seen in Libya, even small teams of Western special operations forces working to advise and coordinate close air support for local forces could provide a tremendous boost to their combat capability.

Because of these factors, it is in the Malian government’s best interests to paint the MNLA as associated with AQIM — and of the MNLA to deny such association. The MNLA vociferously has denied ties to AQIM and even claims that once it controls the northern part of Mali, it will serve as a buffer against AQIM. The truth probably lies somewhere in between these statements.

In the past, Tuareg opposition networks have had varying degrees of involvement with AQIM. For example, former rebel leader Ibrahim Ag Bahanga (the deceased cousin of MNLA leader Ag Mohamed Najem) is thought to have maintained close associations with AQIM for financial reasons. Arab smugglers are known to pay large fees for protection as they run drugs, fuel, arms, cigarettes and migrants across Tuareg territory. There are also reports that Tuareg tribesmen have kidnapped Westerners in the Sahel and that those Westerners somehow made their way into AQIM custody, perhaps after being traded or sold.

The nuances of the relationship between AQIM, the Tuareg insurgents and smuggling networks in the Sahel are complex but appear to be linked primarily to the economic needs of the Tuaregs. Ag Bahanga clearly appears to have been plugged into these smuggling networks and to have used them, along with the patronage of Gadhafi, to fund and support his rebel movement.

With the cessation of supply lines from Libya, the MNLA must have a stream of income, food and ammunition if it is to sustain itself for the long term. Despite the MNLA’s claims that it would clean up smuggling in the north, it would not be difficult for the MNLA to look to traditional smuggling networks as its principal source of revenue in much the same way AQIM currently does. We are unsure of how closely the MNLA will work with AQIM. Logically, it would likely cooperate, or not cooperate, with AQIM as best suits its cause.

Outlook

As the MNLA continues its efforts to establish control over northern Mali, and the Malian government works to prevent that from occurring, we will be looking at a number of factors to help determine which way the struggle is going.

First, the Libyan weapons currently under MNLA’s control give it an ability to support itself in the short term, but it will need to find alternative sources of supply if it is going to be able to sustain its offensive operations. One option would be to re-establish Libyan lines of supply through a new relationship with the black and gray arms market there.

This means we will also need to watch for more defections from the Malian government and army — especially units deserting with their equipment.

Second, the MNLA will need to win the hearts and minds of the people if it is to succeed in its insurgency. We will need to watch for indications that other tribal groups are jumping on the MNLA bandwagon and for the reaction of local populations to MNLA activities. So far, local populations have fled the MNLA. They also have conducted demonstrations in some places, demanding that the government take action against the MNLA. Alternatively, the MNLA could seek to drive opponents out of the regions it seeks to control, so we also need to watch for indications that it is driving civilians who do not support it out of the areas in which it operates.

Western help could dramatically change the situation, especially in areas like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources and strike aircraft. We need to watch carefully for the increased deployment of such systems or of special operations forces to Mali and their use against the MNLA and not just against AQIM.

Algeria is positioning itself to serve as a neutral mediator, as it has in past confrontations between the Malian government and the Tuaregs. Algiers has temporarily frozen its operations and training with the Malian military and withdrawn its advisers from the northern states to avoid being caught in the middle of the clashes. Algerian diplomats reportedly have reached out to Tuareg tribal leaders in Algeria’s own southern desert to pressure their counterparts in Mali to return to talks. The Algerian government has refused to treat wounded MNLA fighters, instead insisting on maintaining its neutral stance in the conflict, meaning that it is unlikely that the MNLA will be able to turn to Algeria if Malian forces push it into a corner. Like Algeria, Niger and Libya have their own Tuareg populations and internal stability issues and thus are not likely to take risks for the MNLA. This could put the group in a very tight spot, so we need to carefully watch the Algerian mediation efforts.

By Scott Stewart

The Nigerian militant group Boko Haram conducted a series of bombing attacks and armed assaults Jan. 20 in the northern city of Kano, the capital of Kano state and second-largest city in Nigeria. The attacks, which reportedly included the employment of at least two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), targeted a series of police facilities in Kano. These included the regional police headquarters, which directs police operations in Kano, Katsina and Jigawa states, as well as the State Security Service office and the Nigerian Immigration Service office. At least 211 people died in the Kano attacks, according to media reports.

The group carried out a second wave of attacks in Bauchi state on Jan. 22, bombing two unoccupied churches in the Bauchi metropolitan area and attacking a police station in the Tafawa Balewa local government area. Militants reportedly also tried to rob a bank in Tafawa Balewa the same day. Though security forces thwarted the robbery attempt, 10 people reportedly died in the clash, including two soldiers and a deputy police superintendent.

In a third attack, Boko Haram militants attacked a police sub-station in Kano on Jan. 24 with small arms and improvised hand grenades. A tally of causalities in the assault, which reportedly lasted some 25 minutes, was not available. This armed assault stands out tactically from the Jan. 20 suicide attacks against police stations in Kano. The operation could have been an attempt to liberate some of the Boko Haram militants the government arrested following the Jan. 20 and Jan. 22 attacks.

Stratfor has followed Boko Haram carefully to assess its intent — and ability — to become more transnational. As we noted after the U.S. State Department issued warnings in early November 2011 about Boko Haram’s alleged plans to strike Western-owned hotels in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, the group made significant leaps in its operational capability during 2011. During that time, it transitioned from very simple attacks to successfully employing suicide VBIEDS. An examination of the recent attacks in Kano and Bauchi states, however, does not reveal further advances in the group’s operational tradecraft and does not display any new ability or intent to project power beyond its traditional areas of operation.

Boko Haram’s Tactical Evolution

Boko Haram, Hausa for “Western Education is Sinful,” is an Islamist militant group established in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Nigeria’s Borno state. It has since spread to several other northern and central Nigerian states. It is officially known as “Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad,” Arabic for “Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.”

At first, Boko Haram was involved mostly in fomenting sectarian violence. Its adherents participated in simple attacks on Christians using clubs, machetes and small arms. Boko Haram came to international attention following serious outbreaks of inter-communal violence in 2008 and 2009 that resulted in thousands of deaths.

By late 2010, Boko Haram had added Molotov cocktails and simple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to its tactical repertoire. This tactical advancement was reflected in the series of small IEDs deployed against Christian targets in Jos, Plateau state, on Christmas Eve 2010.

Boko Haram conducted a number of other armed assaults and small IED attacks in early 2011. The IEDs involved in these attacks were either improvised hand grenades constructed by filling soft drink cans with explosives — which were frequently thrown from motorcycles — or slightly larger devices left at the target.

This attack paradigm was shattered June 16, 2011, when Boko Haram launched a suicide VBIED attack against the headquarters of the Nigerian national police in Abuja. Though not overly spectacular (security measures kept the device away from the headquarters building and it exploded in a parking lot), the successful deployment of a large VBIED and a suicide operative represented a dramatic leap in Boko Haram’s capability. An organization does not normally develop such a capability internally without some signs of progressive advancement in its bombmaking capability. For example, a group would be expected to employ medium-sized IEDs before it employed large VBIEDS. That it skipped a step prompted us to believe reports of Boko Haram members receiving training from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Africa or from al Shabaab in Somalia (or some other outside group).

Boko Haram conducted its second suicide VBIED attack in Abuja on Aug. 26, 2011, this time targeting a U.N. compound in the city’s diplomatic district. This attack proved far more deadly because the driver was able to enter the compound and reach a parking garage before detonating his device near the building’s entrance. The attack against the U.N. compound also marked a break from Boko Haram’s traditional target set of government and Christian facilities.

If the intelligence that triggered the warnings of hotel attacks in November 2011 is accurate, it appears the group may also have considered transnational targets — at least to the extent of seeking to eliminate involvement by the international community in Nigeria in order to undercut Abuja. This shift in targeting raised concerns that the group’s contacts with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and/or al Shabaab had influenced it. It also raised fears that due to its rapidly evolving attack capability, Boko Haram now was on a trajectory to become the next jihadist franchise group to become a transnational terrorist threat, following in the steps of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen-based al Qaeda franchise group. The January attacks provide us an opportunity to evaluate this theory.

What the January Attacks Tell Us

First, the group appears to have no shortage of explosive material. In addition to the devices the group employed in the attacks, the police reportedly seized some 300 improvised grenades and 10 VBIEDs. It also appears Boko Haram has access to large quantities of commercial explosives, rather than being forced to rely on less reliable and less stable improvised explosive mixtures. A good deal of mining occurs in central Nigeria, and it seems that the group is either stealing commercial explosives from mining companies, extorting mining companies for explosives or has somehow been able to purchase commercial explosives using a front company or companies. The Nigerian government has sought to tighten controls on commercial explosives in response, but its efforts so far do not seem to have affected the group’s ability to procure large quantities of explosives.

Boko Haram also appears to have competent bombmakers. While the improvised hand grenades the group is issuing are quite rudimentary, being made by inserting a non-electric detonator with a short piece of time fuse in a soda can filled with high explosives, their devices are functioning as designed. The same can be said for their suicide vests and VBIEDS: They are simple yet functional. This stands out, since IEDs commonly malfunction. Bombmaking is an art that normally follows a significant learning curve absent outside instruction from a more experienced bombmaker. Boko Haram’s proficiency suggests the group’s bombmaker(s) indeed received training from experienced militants elsewhere.

The group also appears to have had no problems recruiting militants, including suicide bombers. The Jan. 20 attacks alone involved dozens of militants. Two people served as suicide bombers for the VBIEDs while perhaps two other suicide bombers worked on foot; others threw IEDs from motorcycles and conducted armed assaults.

That said, the group’s operational planners do not appear to be as advanced as their bombmakers and recruiters. Though they have proved fairly successful in attacking soft targets, they have not had much success in their attacks against harder targets. For example, the attacker in the Jan. 20 strike on the State Security Service office in Kano was shot and killed before he could approach the building. Likewise, security forces were able to repel the attackers in the Jan. 22 attempted bank robbery in Tafawa Balewa.

All three January attacks also occurred in Boko Haram’s traditional area of operations in the northern and central regions of Nigeria. These areas are both familiar and accessible to the group and it has strong support there. (It also has significant support in the area around Abuja.) The group has yet to display an ability to project power outside its traditional operational area into less familiar and more hostile environments.

Some ask whether Boko Haram is merely a political tool used by northern politicians to pressure the Nigerian federal government in much the same way politicians from the Niger Delta have used militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta to ensure what they believe is their fair share of Nigeria’s oil revenue. While undoubtedly some connections between some northern politicians and Boko Haram exist, it would be simplistic to suggest such politicians completely control Boko Haram. Indeed, the Nigerian newspaper Vanguard reported Jan. 24 that senior Boko Haram figures said Jan. 21 that they were retaliating against northern governors who had refused to pay the group previously agreed-upon monthly sums of cash not to conduct operations in their state and for allowing security forces to arrest groups of their members, as they did Jan. 18 when six Boko Haram leaders were detained in Maiduguri. (One of the arrested leaders, Kabiru Sokoto, escaped later when gunmen likely affiliated with Boko Haram attacked the police vehicles transporting him.)

At the very least, however, these recent attacks tell us that before the group can become an existential threat to the Nigerian government — or a legitimate transnational threat — it will need to develop the ability to deploy its IEDs and suicide operatives to the point that it successfully can attack hardened targets. It will also need to develop the ability to work beyond its traditional areas of operation. Until it can master those skills (and display an intent to use such skills), it will remain a regional, albeit deadly, threat.

By George Friedman

Last week, I wrote on the strategic challenge Iran faces in its bid to shape a sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to Beirut on the eastern Mediterranean coast. I also pointed out the limited options available to the United States and other Western powers to counter Iran.

One was increased efforts to block Iranian influence in Syria. The other was to consider a strategy of negotiation with Iran. In the past few days, we have seen hints of both.

Rebel Gains in Syria

The city of Zabadani in southwestern Syria reportedly has fallen into the hands of anti-regime forces. Though the city does not have much tactical value for the rebels, and the regime could well retake it, the event could have real significance. Up to this point, apart from media attention, the resistance to the regime of President Bashar al Assad has not proven particularly effective. It was certainly not able to take and hold territory, which is critical for any insurgency to have significance.

Now that the rebels have taken Zabadani amid much fanfare — even though it is not clear to what extent the city was ceded to their control, much less whether they will be able to hold it against Syrian military action — a small bit of Syria now appears to be under rebel control. The longer they can hold it, the weaker al Assad will look and the more likely it becomes that regime opponents can create a provisional government on Syrian soil to rally around.

Zabadani also gives outside powers something to help defend, should they choose to do so. Intervening in a civil war against weak and diffused rebels is one thing. Attacking Syrian tanks moving to retake Zabadani is quite another. There are no indications that this is under consideration, but for the first time, there is the potential for a militarily viable target set for outside players acting on behalf of the rebels. The existence of that possibility might change the dynamic in Syria. When we take into account the atmospherics of the Arab League demands for a provisional government, some meaningful pressure might actually emerge.

From the Iranian point of view, this raises the risk that the sphere of influence Tehran is pursuing will be blocked by the fall of the al Assad regime. This would not pose a fundamental challenge to Iran, so long as its influence in Iraq remains intact, but it would represent a potential high-water mark in Iranian ambitions. It could open the door to recalculations in Tehran as to the limits of Iranian influence and the threat to their national security. I must not overstate this: Events in Syria have not gone that far, and Iran is hardly backed into a corner. Still, it is a reminder to Tehran that all might not go the Iranians’ way.

A Possibility of Negotiations

It is in this context that the possibility of negotiations has arisen. The Iranians have claimed that the letter the U.S. administration sent to Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that defined Iran’s threats to Strait of Hormuz as a red line contained a second paragraph offering direct talks with Iran. After hesitation, the United States denied the offer of talks, but it did not deny it had sent a message to the Iranian leadership. The Iranians then claimed such an offer was made verbally to Tehran and not in the letter. Washington again was not categorical in its denial. On Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said during a meeting with the German foreign minister, “We do not seek conflict. We strongly believe the people of Iran deserve a better future. They can have that future, the country can be reintegrated into the global community … when their government definitively turns away from pursuing nuclear weapons.”

From our perspective, this is a critical idea. As we have said for several years, we do not see Iran as close to having a nuclear weapon. They may be close to being able to test a crude nuclear device under controlled circumstances (and we don’t know this either), but the development of a deliverable nuclear weapon poses major challenges for Iran.

Moreover, while the Iranians may aspire to a deterrent via a viable nuclear weapons capability, we do not believe the Iranians see nuclear weapons as militarily useful. A few such weapons could devastate Israel, but Iran would be annihilated in retaliation. While the Iranians talk aggressively, historically they have acted cautiously. For Iran, nuclear weapons are far more valuable as a notional threat and bargaining chip than as something to be deployed. Indeed, the ideal situation is not quite having a weapon, and therefore not forcing anyone to act against them, but seeming close enough to be taken seriously. They certainly have achieved that.

The important question, therefore, is this: What would the United States offer if Iran made meaningful concessions on its nuclear program, and what would Iran want in return? In other words, forgetting the nuclear part of the equation, what did Hillary Clinton mean when she said that Iran can be reintegrated into the international community, and what would Iran actually want?

Recall that in our view, nuclear weapons never have been the issue. Instead, the issue has been the development of an Iranian sphere of influence following the withdrawal of the United States from Iraq, and the pressure Iran could place on oil-producing states on the Arabian Peninsula. Iran has long felt that its natural role as leader in the Persian Gulf has been thwarted, first by the Ottomans, then the British and now by the Americans, and they have wanted to create what they regard as the natural state of things.

The United States and its allies do not want Iran to get nuclear weapons. But more than that, they do not want to see Iran as the dominant conventional force in the area able to use its influence to undermine the Saudis. With or without nuclear weapons, the United States must contain the Iranians to protect their Saudi allies. But the problem is that Iran is not contained in Syria yet, and even were it contained in Syria, it is not contained in Iraq. Iran has broken out of its containment in a decisive fashion, and its ability to exert pressure in Arabia is substantial.

Assume for the moment that Iran was willing to abandon its nuclear program. What would the United States give in return? Obviously, Clinton would like to offer an end to the sanctions. But the sanctions on Iran are simply not that onerous with the Russians and Chinese not cooperating and the United States being forced to allow the Japanese and others not to participate fully. But it goes deeper.

Iran’s Historic Opportunity

This is a historic opportunity for Iran. It is the first moment in which no outside power is in a direct position to block Iran militarily or politically. Whatever the pain of sanctions, trading that moment for lifting the sanctions would not be rational. The threat of Iranian influence is the problem, and Iran would not trade that influence for an end to sanctions. So assuming the nuclear issue was to go away, what exactly is the United States prepared to offer?

The United States has assured access to oil from the Persian Gulf — not only for itself, but also for the global industrial world — since World War II. It does not want to face a potential interruption of oil for any reason, like the one that occurred in 1973. Certainly, as Iran expands its influence, the possibility of conflict increases, along with the possibility that the United States would intervene to protect its allies in Arabia from Iranian-sponsored subversion or even direct attack. The United States does not want to intervene in the region. It does not want an interruption of oil. It also does not want an extension of Iranian power. It is not clear that Washington can have all three.

Iran wants three things, too.

First, it wants the United States to reduce its presence in the Persian Gulf dramatically. Having seen two U.S. interventions against Iraq and one against Afghanistan, Iran is aware of U.S. power and the way American political sentiment can shift. It experienced the shift from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, so it knows how fast things can change. Tehran sees the United States in the Persian Gulf coupled with U.S. and Israeli covert operations and destabilization campaigns as an unpredictable danger to Iranian national security.

Second, the Iranians want to be recognized as the leading power in the region. This does not mean they intend to occupy any nation directly. It does mean that Iran doesn’t want Saudi Arabia, for example, to pose a military threat against it.

Third, Iran wants a restructuring of oil revenue in the region. How this is formally achieved — whether by allowing Iranian investment in Arabian oil companies (possibly financed by the host country) or some other means — is unimportant. What does matter is that the Iranians want a bigger share of the region’s vast financial resources.

The United States doesn’t want a conflict with Iran. Iran doesn’t want one with the United States. Neither can be sure how such a conflict would play out. The Iranians want to sell oil. The Americans want the West to be able to buy oil. The issue really comes down to whether the United States wants to guarantee the flow of oil militarily or via a political accommodation with the country that could disrupt the flow of oil — namely, Iran. That in turn raises two questions. First, could the United States trust Iran? And second, could it live with withdrawing the American protectorate on the Arabian Peninsula, casting old allies adrift?

When we listen to the rhetoric of American and Iranian politicians, it is difficult to imagine trust between them. But when we recall the U.S. alliance with Stalin and Mao or the Islamic republic’s collaboration with the Soviet Union, we find rhetoric is a very poor guide. Nations pursue their national interest, and while those interests are never eternal, they can be substantial. From a purely rhetorical point of view it is not always easy to tell which sides’ politicians are more colorful. It will be difficult to sell an alliance between the Great Satan and a founding member of the Axis of Evil to the respective public of each country, but harder things have been managed.

Iran’s ultimate interest is security against the United States and the ability to sell oil at a more substantial profit. (This would entail an easing of sanctions and a redefinition of how oil revenues in the region are distributed.) The United States’ ultimate interest is access to oil and manageable prices that do not require American military intervention. On that basis, Iranian and American interests are not that far apart.

The Arabian Factor and a Possible Accommodation

The key point in this scenario is the future of U.S. relations with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Any deal between Iran and the United States affects them two ways. First, the reduction of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf requires them to reach an accommodation with the Iranians, something difficult and potentially destabilizing for them. Second, the shift in the financial flow will hurt them and probably will not be the final deal. Over time, the Iranians will use their strengthened position in the region to continue pushing for additional concessions from them.

There is always danger in abandoning allies. Other allies might be made uncomfortable, for example. But these things have happened before. Abandoning old allies for the national interest is not something the United States invented. The idea that the United States should find money flowing to the Saudis inherently more attractive than money flowing to the Iranians is not obvious.

The main question for the United States is how Iran might be contained. The flow of money will strengthen Iran, and it might seek to extend its power beyond what is tolerable to the United States. There are potential answers. First, the United States can always return to the region. The Iranians do not see the Americans as weak, but rather as unpredictable. Challenging the United States after Iran has achieved its historic goal is not likely. Second, no matter how Iran grows, it is far behind Turkey by every measure. Turkey is not ready to play an active role balancing Iran now, but in the time it takes Iran to consolidate its position, Turkey will be a force that will balance and eventually contain Iran. In the end, a deal will come down to one that profits both sides and clearly defines the limits of Iranian power — limits that it is in Iran’s interest to respect given that it is profiting mightily from the deal.

Geopolitics leads in one direction. Ideology leads in another direction. The ability to trust one another is yet a third. At the same time, the Iranians cannot be sure of what the United States is prepared to do. The Americans do not want to go to war with Iran. Both want oil flowing, and neither cares about nuclear weapons as much as they pretend. Finally, no one else really matters in this deal. The Israelis are not as hardline on Iran as they appear, nor will the United States listen to Israel on a matter fundamental to the global economy. In the end, absent nuclear weapons, Israel does not have that much of a problem with Iran.

It would not surprise me to find out that the United States offered direct talks, nor to discover that Clinton’s comments could not be extended to a more extensive accommodation. Nor do I think that Iran would miss a chance for an historic transformation of its strategic and financial position in favor of ideology. They are much too cynical for that. The great losers would be the Saudis, but even they could come around to a deal that, while less satisfactory than they have now, is still quite satisfactory.

There are many blocks in the way of such a deal, from ideology to distrust to domestic politics. But given the knot that is being tied in the region, rumors that negotiations are being floated come as no surprise. Syria might not go the way Iran wants, and Iraq is certainly not going the way the United States wants. Marriages have been built on less.

As we noted in last year’s annual cartel report, Mexico in 2010 bore witness to some 15,273 deaths in connection with the drug trade. The death toll for 2010 surpassed that of any previous year, and in doing so became the deadliest year ever in the country’s fight against the cartels. But in the bloody chronology that is Mexico’s cartel war, 2010′s time at the top may have been short-lived. Despite the Mexican government’s efforts to curb cartel-related violence, the death toll for 2011 may have exceeded what had been an unprecedented number.

According to the Mexican government, cartel-related homicides claimed around 12,900 lives from January to September — about 1,400 deaths per month. While this figure is lower than that of 2010, it does not account for the final quarter of 2011. The Mexican government has not yet released official statistics for the entire year, but if the monthly average held until year’s end, the overall death toll for 2011 would reach 17,000. Though most estimates put the total below that, the actual number of homicides in Mexico is likely higher than what is officially reported. At the very least, although we do not have a final, official number — and despite media reports to the contrary — we can conclude that violence in Mexico did not decline substantially in 2011.

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By George Friedman

The United States reportedly sent a letter to Iran via multiple intermediaries last week warning Tehran that any attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz constituted a red line for Washington. The same week, a chemist associated with Iran’s nuclear program was killed in Tehran. In Ankara, Iranian parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani met with Turkish officials and has been floating hints of flexibility in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.

This week, a routine rotation of U.S. aircraft carriers is taking place in the Middle East, with the potential for three carrier strike groups to be on station in the U.S. Fifth Fleet’s area of operations and a fourth carrier strike group based in Japan about a week’s transit from the region. Next week, Gen. Michael Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will travel to Israel to meet with senior Israeli officials. And Iran is scheduling another set of war games in the Persian Gulf for February that will focus on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ irregular tactics for closing the Strait of Hormuz.

While tensions are escalating in the Persian Gulf, the financial crisis in Europe has continued, with downgrades in France’s credit rating the latest blow. Meanwhile, China continued its struggle to maintain exports in the face of economic weakness among its major customers while inflation continued to increase the cost of Chinese exports.

Fundamental changes in how Europe and China work and their long-term consequences represent the major systemic shifts in the international system. In the more immediate future, however, the U.S.-Iranian dynamic has the most serious potential consequences for the world.

The U.S.-Iranian Dynamic

The increasing tensions in the region are not unexpected. As we have argued for some time, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent decision to withdraw created a massive power vacuum in Iraq that Iran needed — and was able — to fill. Iran and Iraq fought a brutal war in the 1980s that caused about 1 million Iranian casualties, and Iran’s fundamental national interest is assuring that no Iraqi regime able to threaten Iranian national security re-emerges. The U.S. invasion and withdrawal from Iraq provided Iran an opportunity to secure its western frontier, one it could not pass on.

If Iran does come to have a dominant influence in Iraq — and I don’t mean Iran turning Iraq into a satellite — several things follow. Most important, the status of the Arabian Peninsula is subject to change. On paper, Iran has the most substantial conventional military force of any nation in the Persian Gulf. Absent outside players, power on paper is not insignificant. While technologically sophisticated, the military strength of the Arabian Peninsula nations on paper is much smaller, and they lack the Iranian military’s ideologically committed manpower.

But Iran’s direct military power is more the backdrop than the main engine of Iranian power. It is the strength of Tehran’s covert capabilities and influence that makes Iran significant. Iran’s covert intelligence capability is quite good. It has spent decades building political alliances by a range of means, and not only by nefarious methods. The Iranians have worked among the Shia, but not exclusively so; they have built a network of influence among a range of classes and religious and ethnic groups. And they have systematically built alliances and relationships with significant figures to counter overt U.S. power. With U.S. military power departing Iraq, Iran’s relationships become all the more valuable.

The withdrawal of U.S. forces has had a profound psychological impact on the political elites of the Persian Gulf. Since the decline of British power after World War II, the United States has been the guarantor of the Arabian Peninsula’s elites and therefore of the flow of oil from the region. The foundation of that guarantee has been military power, as seen in the response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The United States still has substantial military power in the Persian Gulf, and its air and naval forces could likely cope with any overt provocation by Iran.

But that’s not how the Iranians operate. For all their rhetoric, they are cautious in their policies. This does not mean they are passive. It simply means that they avoid high-risk moves. They will rely on their covert capabilities and relationships. Those relationships now exist in an environment in which many reasonable Arab leaders see a shift in the balance of power, with the United States growing weaker and less predictable in the region and Iran becoming stronger. This provides fertile soil for Iranian allies to pressure regional regimes into accommodations with Iran.

The Syrian Angle

Events in Syria compound this situation. The purported imminent collapse of Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria has proved less imminent than many in the West imagined. At the same time, the isolation of the al Assad regime by the West — and more important, by other Arab countries — has created a situation where the regime is more dependent than ever on Iran.

Should the al Assad regime — or the Syrian regime without al Assad — survive, Iran would therefore enjoy tremendous influence with Syria, as well as with Hezbollah in Lebanon. The current course in Iraq coupled with the survival of an Alawite regime in Syria would create an Iranian sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean. This would represent a fundamental shift in the regional balance of power and probably would redefine Iranian relations with the Arabian Peninsula. This is obviously in Iran’s interest. It is not in the interests of the United States, however.

The United States has sought to head this off via a twofold response. Clandestinely, it has engaged in an active campaign of sabotage and assassination targeting Iran’s nuclear efforts. Publicly, it has created a sanctions regime against Iran, most recently targeting Iran’s oil exports. However, the latter effort faces many challenges.

Japan, the No. 2 buyer of Iranian crude, has pledged its support but has not outlined concrete plans to reduce its purchases. The Chinese and Indians — Iran’s No. 1 and 3 buyers of crude, respectively — will continue to buy from Iran despite increased U.S. pressure. In spite of U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s visit last week, the Chinese are not prepared to impose sanctions, and the Russians are not likely to enforce sanctions even if they agreed to them. Turkey is unwilling to create a confrontation with Iran and is trying to remain a vital trade conduit for the Iranians regardless of sanctions. At the same time, while the Europeans seem prepared to participate in harder-hitting sanctions on Iranian oil, they already have delayed action on these sanctions and certainly are in no position politically or otherwise to participate in military action. The European economic crisis is at root a political crisis, so even if the Europeans could add significant military weight, which they generally lack, concerted action of any sort is unlikely.

Neither, for that matter, does the United States have the ability to do much militarily. Invading Iran is out of the question. The mountainous geography of Iran, a nation of about 70 million people, makes direct occupation impossible given available American forces.

Air operations against Iran are an option, but they could not be confined to nuclear facilities. Iran still doesn’t have nuclear weapons, and while nuclear weapons would compound the strategic problem, the problem would still exist without them. The center of gravity of Iran’s power is the relative strength of its conventional forces in the region. Absent those, Iran would be less capable of wielding covert power, as the psychological matrix would shift.

An air campaign against Iran’s conventional forces would play to American military strengths, but it has two problems. First, it would be an extended campaign, one lasting months. Iran’s capabilities are large and dispersed, and as seen in Desert Storm and Kosovo against weaker opponents, such operations take a long time and are not guaranteed to be effective. Second, the Iranians have counters. One, of course, is the Strait of Hormuz. The second is the use of its special operations forces and allies in and out of the region to conduct terrorist attacks. An extended air campaign coupled with terrorist attacks could increase distrust of American power rather than increase it among U.S. allies, to say nothing of the question of whether Washington could sustain political support in a coalition or within the United States itself.

The Covert Option

The United States and Israel both have covert options as well. They have networks of influence in the region and highly capable covert forces, which they have said publicly that they would use to limit Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons without resorting to overt force. We assume, though we lack evidence, that the assassination of the Iranian chemist associated with the country’s nuclear program last week was either a U.S. or Israeli operation or some combination of the two. Not only did it eliminate a scientist, it also bred insecurity and morale problems among those working on the program. It also signaled the region that the United States and Israel have options inside Iran.

The U.S. desire to support an Iranian anti-government movement generally has failed. Tehran showed in 2009 that it could suppress demonstrations, and it was obvious that the demonstrators did not have the widespread support needed to overcome such repression. Though the United States has sought to support internal dissidents in Iran since 1979, it has not succeeded in producing a meaningful threat to the clerical regime. Therefore, covert operations are being aimed directly at the nuclear program with the hope that successes there might ripple through other, more immediately significant sectors.

As we have long argued, the Iranians already have a “nuclear option,” namely, the prospect of blockading the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 35 percent of seaborne crude and 20 percent of the world’s traded oil passes daily. Doing so would hurt them, too, of course. But failing to deter an air or covert campaign, they might choose to close off the strait. Temporarily disrupting the flow of oil, even intermittently, could rapidly create a global economic crisis given the fragility of the world economy.

The United States does not want to see that. Washington will be extremely cautious in its actions unless it can act with a high degree of assurance that it can prevent such a disruption, something difficult to guarantee. It also will restrain Israel, which might have the ability to strike at a few nuclear facilities but lacks the force to completely eliminate the program much less target Iran’s conventional capability and manage the consequences of that strike in the Strait of Hormuz. Only the United States could do all that, and given the possible consequences, it will be loathe to attempt it.

The United States continues, therefore, with sanctions and covert actions while Iran continues building its covert power in Iraq and in the region. Each will try to convince the region that its power will be supreme in a year. The region is skeptical of both, but will have to live with one of the two, or with an ongoing test of wills — an unnerving prospect. Each side is seeking to magnify its power for psychological effect without crossing a red line that prompts the other to take extreme measures. Iran signals its willingness to attempt to close Hormuz and its development of nuclear weapons, but it doesn’t cross the line to actually closing the strait or detonating a nuclear device. The United States pressures Iran and moves forces around, but it doesn’t cross the red line of commencing military actions. Thus, each avoids triggering unacceptable actions by the other.

The problem for the United States is that the status quo ultimately works against it. If al Assad survives and if the situation in Iraq proceeds as it has been proceeding, then Iran is creating a reality that will define the region. The United States does not have a broad and effective coalition, and certainly not one that would rally in the event of war. It has only Israel, and Israel is as uneasy with direct military action as the United States is. It does not want to see a failed attack and it does not want to see more instability in the Arab world. For all its rhetoric, Israel has a weak hand to play. The only virtue of the American hand is that it is stronger — but only relatively speaking.

For the United States, preventing the expansion of an Iranian sphere of influence is a primary concern. Iraq is going to be a difficult arena to stop Iran’s expansion. Syria therefore is key at present. Al Assad appears weak, and his replacement by a Sunni government would limit — but not destroy — any Iranian sphere of influence. It would be a reversal for Iran, and the United States badly needs to apply one. But the problem is that the United States cannot be seen as the direct agent of regime change in Syria, and al Assad is not as weak as has been claimed. Even so, Syria is where the United States can work to block Iran without crossing Iran’s red lines.

The normal outcome of a situation like this one, in which neither Iran nor the United States can afford to cross the other’s red lines since the consequences would be too great for each, would be some sort of negotiation toward a longer-term accommodation. Ideology aside — and the United States negotiating with the “Axis of Evil” or Iran with the “Great Satan” would be tough sells to their respective domestic audiences — the problem with this is that it is difficult to see what each has to offer the other. What Iran wants — a dominant position in the region and a redefinition of how oil revenues are allocated and distributed — would make the United States dependent on Iran. What the United States wants — an Iran that does not build a sphere of influence but instead remains within its borders — would cost Iran a historic opportunity to assert its longstanding claims.

We find ourselves in a situation in which neither side wants to force the other into extreme steps and neither side is in a position to enter into broader accommodations. And that’s what makes the situation dangerous. When fundamental issues are at stake, each side is in a position to profoundly harm the other if pressed, and neither side is in a position to negotiate a broad settlement, a long game of chess ensues. And in that game of chess, the possibilities of miscalculation, of a bluff that the other side mistakes for an action, are very real.

Europe and China are redefining the way the world works. But kingdoms run on oil, as someone once said, and a lot of oil comes through Hormuz. Iran may or may not be able to close the strait, and that reshapes Europe and China. The New Year thus begins where we expected: at the Strait of Hormuz.

One of the most iconic images of the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — as well as global U.S. counterterrorism efforts — has been the armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), specifically the MQ-1 “Predator” and the MQ-9 “Reaper.” Unarmed RQ-1 Predators (which first flew in 1994) were flying over Afghanistan well before the 9/11 attacks. Less than a month after the attacks, an armed variant already in development was deployed for the first time.

In the decade since, the Predator has clocked more than a million flight hours. And while U.S. Air Force procurement ceased in early 2011 — with more than 250 airframes purchased — the follow-on MQ-9 Reaper has already been procured in numbers and production continues. Predators and Reapers continue to be employed in a broad spectrum of roles, including close air support (CAS), when forward air controllers communicate with UAV operators to release ordnance with friendly troops in the vicinity (CAS is one of the more challenging missions even for manned aircraft because of the heightened risk of friendly casualties). Officially designated “armed, multi-mission, medium-altitude, long endurance, remotely piloted aircraft,” the second to last distinction is the Predator and Reaper’s principal value: the ability to loiter for extended periods, in some cases for more than 24 hours.

This ability affords unprecedented situational awareness and physical presence over the battlefield. The implications of this are still being understood, but it is clear that it allows, for example, the sustained and constant monitoring of main supply routes for attempts to emplace improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or the ability to establish a more sophisticated understanding of high-value targets’ living patterns. In addition, live, full-motion video for ground controllers is available to lower and lower echelons to an unprecedented degree.

As the procurement of Predators and Reapers and the training of operators accelerated — particularly under the tenure of former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, beginning in 2006 — the number of UAV “orbits” skyrocketed (an orbit is a single, continuous presence requiring more than one UAV airframe per orbit). There are now more than 50 such orbits in the U.S. Central Command area of operations alone (counting several maintained by the larger, unarmed RQ-4 “Global Hawk”). The U.S. Air Force expects to be capable of maintaining 65 orbits globally by 2013, with the combined total of flight hours for Predator and Reaper operations reaching about 2 million around the same time. In 2005, UAVs made up about 5 percent of the military aircraft fleet. They have since grown to 30 percent, though most are small, hand-launched and unarmed tactical UAVs.

The Counterterrorism Value

One of the most notable uses of the Predator and Reaper has been in the counterterrorism role, both as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platform and as an on-call strike platform. These armed UAVs are operated both by the U.S. Air Force and, in some cases (as with operations conducted over Pakistan), the CIA. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the armed Predator then in development was being considered as a means not only of keeping tabs on Osama bin Laden but also of killing him. Since then, armed UAVs have proved their worth both in the offensive strike role against specific targets and as a means of maintaining a constant level of threat.

The value of the counterterrorism ISR that can be collected by large UAVs alone is limited since so much depends on how and where they are deployed and what they are looking for. This mission requires not only sophisticated signals but also actionable human intelligence. But as a front-line element of a larger, integrated collection strategy, the armed UAV has proved to be a viable and enduring element of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy worldwide.

The ability to loiter is central and has a value far beyond the physical capabilities of a single airframe in a specific orbit. Operating higher than helicopters and with a lower signature than manned, jet-powered fighter aircraft, the UAV is neither visibly or audibly obvious (though the degree of inconspicuousness depends on, among other things, weather and altitude). Because UAVs are so discreet, potential targets must work under the assumption that an armed UAV is orbiting within striking distance at all times.

Such a constant threat can place considerable psychological pressure on the prey, even when the predator is large and loud. During the two battles of Fallujah, Iraq, in April and November of 2004, AC-130 gunships proved particularly devastating for insurgents pinned in certain quadrants of the city, but AC-130s were limited in number and availability. When it was not possible to keep an AC-130 on station at night (in order to keep the insurgents’ heads down), unarmed C-130 transports were flown in the same orbits at altitudes where the distinctive sound of a C-130 could be clearly discerned on the ground, thus maintaining the perception of a possible AC-130 reprisal against any insurgent offensive.

Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the psychological and operational impact of this tactic on a group that experiences successful strikes on its members, even if the strikes are conducted only rarely. Counterterrorism targets in areas where UAVs are known to operate must work under tight communications discipline and constraints, since having their cellular or satellite phone conversations tapped risks not only penetration of communications but immediate and potentially lethal attacks.

The UAV threat was hardly the only factor, but consider how Osama bin Laden’s communiques declined from comparatively regular and timely videos to rare audiotapes. In 2001, bin Laden was operating with immense freedom of maneuver and impunity despite the manhunt already under way for him. That situation changed even as he fled to Pakistan, and the combination of aggressive signals as well as UAV- and space-based ISR efforts further constrained his operational bandwidth and relevance as he was forced to focus more and more on his own personal survival.

The UAV threat affects not only the targeted individuals themselves but also their entire organizations. When the failure to adhere to security protocols can immediately yield lethal results, the natural response is to constrict communications and cease contact with untrusted allies, affiliates and subordinates. When the minutiae of security protocols start to matter, the standard for having full faith, trust and confidence among those belonging to or connected with a terrorist organization become much higher. And the more that organization’s survival is at stake, the more it must focus on survival, thereby reducing its capacity to engage in ambitious operations. On a deeper level, there is also the value of sowing distrust and paranoia within an organization. This has the same ultimate effect of increasing internal distrust and thereby undermining the spare capacity for the pursuit of larger, external objectives.

The Evolving Geography

While armed Predators first operated in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater, it was the darkest days of the Iraq War, at the height of the violence there from 2005 to 2007, that saw the strongest demand for them. As the main effort shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, UAV operations began to shift with them. While UAVs will remain in high demand in Afghanistan even as the drawdown of forces continues there in 2012, the end of armed UAV operations in Iraq and the continued expansion of the U.S. Air Force’s Reaper fleet mean that considerable bandwidth is being freed up for operations in other parts of the world. (In Iraq, some UAVs may continue to be operated over northern Kurdish areas in coordination with Turkey, and some private security contractors are operating a small fleet of unarmed UAVs as part of protection efforts in coordination with the U.S. State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service.)

There are obvious diplomatic and operational limitations to the employment of armed UAVs. Diplomatically, however, they also have demonstrated some value as an intermediate step between purely clandestine operations run by the CIA and the overt deployment of uniformed personnel and manned aircraft. Operationally, while Predators and Reapers lack the sort of low-observability profile of the RQ-170 (one of which was lost over Iran in 2011), UAVs lack pilots and pose no risk of human personnel being taken captive. A UAV that crashes in Iran has far fewer political ramifications than a piloted aircraft, making its deployment an easier decision for political leaders.

Indeed, the last decade has seen the maturation of the armed UAV, including its underlying architecture and doctrines. And while more than 50 Predators and Reapers have been lost in Iraq and Afghanistan and in training over the past decade, the aircraft are now essentially as safe and reliable as a manned F-16C/D but far cheaper to procure, maintain and operate. And over the next 10 years, the Pentagon plans to grow its UAV fleet about 35 percent. The U.S. Air Force plans to buy 288 more Reapers — 48 per year from now through 2016 — and money for UAVs has remained largely untouched even as budget cuts intensify at the Pentagon.

So while armed UAVs are merely one tool of a much broader and more sophisticated counterterrorism strategy, they can be expected to be valuable for the foreseeable future, and employed in areas of the world beyond Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen (even along the U.S.-Mexico border in an unarmed role for border patrol and counternarcotics missions). And despite an enormous breach in U.S.-Pakistani relations following the deaths of two dozen Pakistani military personnel in a cross-border incident in November and the consequent ejection of the CIA from Shamsi airfield in Pakistan (from which it had operated armed UAVs since October 2001), existing UAV orbits have been largely maintained. On Jan. 10, the first strike on Pakistani territory since November took place in North Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

From Military Times:

Vinson, as well as embarked Carrier Air Wing 17, cruiser Bunker Hill and destroyer Halsey, entered 5th Fleet on Jan. 9, where it is expected to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Navy and Defense Department officials said last week that threats and military exercises from Iran would not deter U.S. forces from continuing to work in the region and that operations were running as usual with no special response to Iran’s provocations.

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