$100K Reward for EDUARDO RAVELO – FBI Most Wanted

Gary — Mon, 06 Sep 2010 22:41:50 +0000

From: FBI

Eduardo Ravelo

Photograph taken in 1998

Ravelo is known to be a Captain (Capo) within the Barrio Azteca criminal enterprise and is allegedly responsible for issuing orders to the Barrio Azteca members residing in Juarez, Mexico. Allegedly, Ravelo and the Barrio Azteca members act as “hitmen” for the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Drug Trafficking Organization and are responsible for numerous murders. Ravelo has ties to Mexico and El Paso, Texas. He may have had plastic surgery and altered his fingerprints.

Wanted for engaging in the affairs of an enterprise, through a pattern of racketeering activities; conspiracy to conduct the affairs of an enterprise, through a pattern of racketeering activities; conspiracy to launder monetary instruments; conspiracy to possess heroin, cocaine and marijuana with the intent to distribute.

CAUTION
Eduardo Ravelo was indicted in Texas in 2008 for his involvement in racketeering activities, conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, and conspiracy to possess heroin, cocaine and marijuana with the intent to distribute. His alleged criminal activities began in 2003.

CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS
IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS PERSON, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI OFFICE OR THE NEAREST U.S. EMBASSY OR CONSULATE.

REWARD
The FBI is offering a reward of up to $100,000 for information leading directly to the arrest of Eduardo Ravelo.

DESCRIPTION

Dates of Birth Used:	October 13, 1968; December 22, 1965; October 15, 1968; November 13, 1968; October 13, 1969	Hair:	Black (possibly bald)
Place of Birth:	Mexico	Eyes:	Brown
Height:	5’9″	Complexion:	Medium
Weight:	150 to 180 pounds	Sex:	Male
Build:	Medium	Race:	White (Hispanic)
Occupation:	Unknown	Nationality:	Mexican
Scars and Marks:	Ravelo has a scar on his face. He also has tattoos on his chest, abdomen, and back.

Afghanistan and the War Legend

Brian — Mon, 06 Sep 2010 17:15:30 +0000

Afghanistan and the War Legend is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

STRATFOR Readers,

As many of you know, Robert Merry joined STRATFOR as publisher in January. While primarily focused on our business (bless him) he is also a noted reporter (years with The Wall Street Journal as Washington correspondent and head of Congressional Quarterly). Bob knows Washington well, while STRATFOR has always been an outsider there. Since Bob brings a new perspective to STRATFOR, we’d be foolish not to take advantage of it. This analysis marks the first of what will be regular contributions to STRATFOR’s work. His commentary will be titled “Washington Looks at the World” and will focus on the international system through the eyes of official Washington and its unofficial outriders. In this first analysis, Bob focuses on the thinking that went into President Barack Obama’s Aug. 31 speech on the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq. As with all of STRATFOR’s pieces, it treats political leaders as rational actors and avoids ideology and advocacy. Both are in ample supply in this country, and there is no need to add to it. Bob is not trying to persuade, praise or condemn. Nor is he simply providing facts. He is trying to understand and explain what is happening. I hope you find this of value. I learned something from it. By all means let us know what you think, especially if you like it. Criticisms will also be read but will not be enjoyed nearly as much.
— George Friedman, STRATFOR CEO

By Robert W. Merry

U.S. President Barack Obama’s Aug. 31 Oval Office speech on the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq had many purposes: to claim a measure of credit for largely fulfilling one of his major campaign promises; to thank those who have served and sacrificed in the cause; to spread the balm of unity over any lingering domestic wounds; to assure Americans that it has all been worth it and that no dishonor was attached to this foreign adventure, which was opposed by many in Obama’s own party and by him from the beginning.

Of all those purposes, and any others that might have been conceived, the need to express assurance of the war’s validity — and honor in its outcome — is by far the most important. Any national leader must protect and nurture the legend of any war over which he presides, even those — actually, particularly those — he has brought to a close. The people need to feel that the sacrifice in blood and treasure was worth it, that the mission’s rationale still makes sense, that the nation’s standing and prestige remain intact.

In terms of America, nothing illustrates this more starkly than the Vietnam experience. This was a war that emerged quite naturally out of a foreign policy outlook, “containment,” that had shaped American behavior in the world for nearly two decades and would continue to shape it for another two decades. Hence, one could argue that the Vietnam War was a noble effort entirely consistent with a policy that eventually proved brilliantly successful. But the national pain of defeat in that war spawned an entirely different legend — that it was a huge mistake and a tragic loss of life for no defensible purpose. The impact of that legend upon the national consciousness could be seen for decades — in war-powers battles between the president and Congress, in a halting defense posture often attributed to what was called the “Vietnam Syndrome,” in the lingering civic hostility engendered when the subject emerged among fellow citizens, in the flow of tears shed daily at Washington’s Vietnam Memorial.

So the presidential responsibility for the legend of war is no trivial matter when young Americans begin returning home in body bags. A wise president will keep it well established in his mind in selling a war, in prosecuting it and eventually in explaining it at its conclusion.

This important presidential function posed two particular challenges for Obama during his Oval Office speech: First, his past opposition to the war in Iraq created a danger that he might appear insincere or artificial in his expressions, and second, it isn’t entirely clear that the legend can hold up, that the stated rationale for the war really withstands serious scrutiny. Yes, America did depose Saddam Hussein and his regime. But the broader aims of the war — to establish a stable, pro-Western regime in the country and thus maintain a geopolitical counterweight to the regional ambitions of Iran — remain unfulfilled. The president handled the first challenge with aplomb, hailing the war’s outcome (so far) while avoiding the political schisms that it bred and delivering expressions of appreciation and respect for his erstwhile adversaries on the issue. Whether he succeeds in the second challenge likely will depend upon events in Iraq, where 50,000 American troops remain to support Iraqi security forces and help maintain stability.

But Obama’s effort to preserve the war’s legend, which was ribboned throughout his speech, raises the specter of an even greater challenge of preserving the legend of a different war — the war in Afghanistan, which Obama says will begin to wind down for America in July of next year. It remains a very open question whether events will unfold in that nettlesome conflict in such a way as to allow for a reassuring legend when the troops come home. That open question is particularly stark given the fundamental reality that America is not going to bring about a victory in Afghanistan in any conventional sense. The Taliban insurgency that the United States is trying to subdue with its counterinsurgency effort is not going to go away and, indeed, the Taliban will likely have to be part of any accommodation that can precede America’s withdrawal.

Thus, the Obama administration has become increasingly focused on what some involved in war planning call “the endgame.” By that, they mean essentially a strategy for extricating the country from Afghanistan while preserving a reasonable level of stability in that troubled land; minimizing damage to American interests; and maintaining a credible legend of the war that is reassuring to the American people. That’s a tall order, and it isn’t clear whether the nearly 150,000 U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan, under U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus, can affect the magnitude of the challenge one way or another.

Very quietly, top officials of the Obama administration have initiated a number of reviews inspecting every aspect of this endgame challenge. Some involve influential outside experts with extensive governmental experience in past administrations, and they are working with officials at the highest levels of the government, including the Pentagon. One review group has sent members to Russia for extensive conversations with officials who were involved in the Soviet Union’s ill-fated invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Others have traveled to Pakistan and other lands, including the United Kingdom, Germany and France, to master the diplomatic implications of any Afghan exit strategy.

It’s too early to determine just what impact these review groups will have on administration thinking, which appears to remain in a state of development. But it can be said that at least some of these outside experts are pressing hard for an endgame approach that moves beyond some earlier thinking about the war and its rationale. For example:

The need to involve Afghanistan’s neighbors in any accommodation that would allow for at least a reasonably graceful American exit. In addition to next-door Pakistan, these likely would include Russia, India and perhaps even Iran. All have a stake in Afghan stability, and all have their own particular interests there. Hence, the diplomatic game will be extremely difficult. But it is worth noting that during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Russia served as a facilitator of U.S. cooperation with the northern ethnic tribes, and Russians even provided personnel and vehicles to America’s Northern Alliance allies. Iran also helped facilitate the invasion by suggesting security for American pilots faced with ditching over Iranian territory.
The necessity of working with local power centers and finding a way of developing a productive discussion with the different ethnic groups that need to be part of the Afghan endgame. How to do that reportedly was one question posed to Russian officials who were involved in the Soviet Union’s Afghan experience and who had to deal with insurgent leaders on the way out.
A probable requirement that the United States relinquish any hope that a strong central government in Kabul will form and bring about stability in the country. Afghanistan has never had a strong central government, and the various ethnic and religious groups, local warlords, tribes and khans aren’t going to submit to any broad national authority. Their mountainous homeland for centuries has afforded them plenty of protection from any invading force, and that isn’t going to change.
A probable need to explore a national system with a traditionally weak central government and strong provincial actors with considerable sway over their particular territories.

Underlying all this is a strong view that the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force cannot impose an endgame. The Taliban are not going to submit to U.S. blandishments for negotiation as a result of any fear of what will happen to them if they don’t. That’s because they are winning and possess the arms, wiles, knowledge of terrain and people and insurgency skills to keep on winning, irrespective of what Petraeus does to thwart them. Besides, the tribes of Afghanistan have demonstrated through the centuries that they have the patience to outlast any invader.

If the Taliban won’t negotiate out of fear of what the U.S. military can do to them, the question becomes whether they will negotiate out of a sense of opportunity — as a means of bringing about the U.S. exit that American government officials increasingly seem to want as well. There are indications the Taliban might be interested in participating in such a negotiated American exit, perhaps in exchange for some kind of international recognition. At this point, however, there is no firm evidence that such an approach could prove fruitful, and hence this question remains one of the great imponderables hovering over America’s presence in Afghanistan.

But, if that does prove possible, the question of America’s war legend will loom very large indeed. Those involved in the review groups reportedly are well aware that the nature of the U.S. departure will inform the legend, and they are intent on crafting an outcome that will honor America’s Afghanistan war dead and U.S. war veterans. In other words, in this view, there must remain a narrative that explains why America was there, what was accomplished, and why the departure was undertaken when it was. It must resonate throughout the nation and must be credible.

This poses another fundamental question: Is there an inherent inconsistency between the outlook emerging from these governmental review groups and the recent pronouncements of Petraeus? Many of the review-group participants seem to be working toward what might be called a “graceful exit” from Afghanistan. Yet Petraeus told The New York Times on Aug. 15 that he does not see his mission in such small terms as a “graceful exit.” Rather, he said his marching orders were to do “all that is humanly possible to help us achieve our objectives.” By “our objectives,” he seemed to mean establishing, through military force, a sufficient degree of stability in the country to allow a negotiated exit on American terms, with his Iraq record serving as the model. Even if that is possible, it certainly will take considerable time. The general made clear in the Times interview and in others that he fully intended to press Obama hard to delay any serious troop withdrawal from Afghanistan until well beyond the July 2011 time frame put forth by the president.

Thus, the nature and pace of withdrawal becomes another big question hovering over the president’s war strategy. Many high-ranking administration officials, including the president, have said the pace of withdrawal will depend upon “conditions on the ground” when July 2011 arrives. Obama repeated that conditional expression in his Iraq speech the other night. But that leaves a lot of room for maneuver — and a lot of room for debate within the administration. The reason for delaying a full withdrawal would be to try to apply further military pressure to force the Taliban to become less resistant. That goal seems to be what’s animating Petraeus. But others, including some involved in the review groups, don’t see much prospect of that actually happening. Thus, they see no reason for much of a withdrawal delay beyond the president’s July deadline — particularly given the need to preserve the country’s war legend. The danger, as some see it, is that an effort to force an outcome through military action, given the unlikely prospect of that, could increase the chances of a traditional military defeat, much like the one suffered by the Soviets in the 1980s and by the British in two brutal military debacles during the 19th century.

Many of the experts involved in the Afghanistan review effort see a link between the departure of U.S. combat troops from Iraq, as described by Obama in his Oval Office speech, and the imperative to fashion an Afghanistan exit that offers a war legend at least as comforting to the American people. Certainly, the importance of the war legend was manifest in Obama’s Iraq speech. First, he repeatedly praised the valor and commitment of America’s men and women in uniform. Even in turning to the need to fix the country’s economic difficulties, he invoked these U.S. military personnel again by saying “we must tackle those challenges at home with as much energy, and grit, and sense of common purpose as our men and women in uniform who have served abroad.” He expressed a resolve to honor their commitment by serving “our veterans as well as they have served us” through the Department of Veterans Affairs, emphasizing medical care and the G.I. Bill. And he drew an evocative word picture of America’s final combat brigade in Iraq — the Army’s 4th Stryker Brigade — journeying toward Kuwait on their way home in the predawn darkness. Many Americans will recall some of these young men, extending themselves from the backs of convoy trucks and yelling into television cameras and lights, “We won! We’re going home! We won the war!”

But, as Obama noted in his speech, this is “an age without surrender ceremonies.” It’s also an age without victory parades. As he said, “we must earn victory through the success of our partners and the strength of our own nation.” That’s a bit vague, though, and that’s why Obama’s speech laid out the elements of the Iraq success in terms that seemed pretty much identical to what George W. Bush would have said. We succeeded in toppling Saddam Hussein. We nurtured an Iraqi effort to craft a democratic structure. After considerable bloodshed, we managed to foster a reasonable amount of civic stability in the country so the Iraqi people can continue their halting pursuit of their own destiny. Thus, said the president, “This completes a transition to Iraqi responsibility for their own security.” He added, “Through this remarkable chapter in the history of the United States and Iraq, we have met our responsibility. Now, it’s time to turn the page.”

That’s probably enough of a legend to fortify the good feelings of those young men yelling of victory from the backs of Stryker Brigade vehicles on the way out of Iraq. But getting to even that degree of a war legend in Afghanistan will be far more difficult. And, as the endgame looms in that distant land, the administration will have to grapple not only with how to prosecute the war and foster a safe exit but also with how to preserve a suitable legend for that war once the shooting stops.

US drone strike kills 8 militants in North Waziristan, Pakistan

Jack Sinclair — Mon, 06 Sep 2010 02:21:22 +0000

“Eight militants, including three foreign fighters, were killed and 12 more injured when a US drone targeted their compound in the volatile North Waziristan tribal region of Pakistan.

The drone fired two missiles at a compound in Datta Khel village, 45km west of Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan Agency late last night, security officials said today.

Foreign militants killed in the attack included Arabs and Central Asians linked to al-Qaeda, officials said.

This was the third US drone strike in the region in 24 hours.

The area was targeted by US missiles twice on Friday, killing six militants in the first strike and four foreign militants in another.”

http://www.nowpublic.com/world/us-drone-strike-kills-8-militants-north-waziristan

General David Petraeus initiates plan to begin to “thin out” his forces.

Jack Sinclair — Sun, 05 Sep 2010 23:42:30 +0000

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates (r) is greeted by top NATO commander Gen. David Petraeus as he arrives in Kabul, 2 Sept 2010

“The commander of U.S. and international troops in Afghanistan said Thursday that he has asked his officers to provide “initial assessments” of where he can begin to “thin out” his forces.

General Petraeus said he asked his staff to make plans to reduce their forces in relatively stable areas…

Petraeus is up against a deadline set by President Obama to begin a U.S. troop withdrawal next July.

The general indicated he does not expect to send home large units or to hand over large areas to Afghan security control. Rather, he said, at the beginning of the process, he will do what the United States did in Iraq and elsewhere – gradually reduce the U.S. troop presence in specific areas.

“You thin out, you don’t just sort of hand them the baton and say, ‘It’s yours,’” he said.

U.S. officials say the initial withdrawal will be small and that additional drawdowns will be based on security conditions in each part of the country.”

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Petraeus-Plans-for-Start-of-US-Withdrawal-from-Afghanistan-Next-Year-102096528.html

Police commandos kill 3 Islamic militants in al-Qaida-linked group resposible for bombings, kidnappings and beheadings

Jack Sinclair — Sun, 05 Sep 2010 23:38:03 +0000

Police commandos in the southern Philippines have killed three Abu Sayyaf militants, including the brother of a top rebel commander.

The assault took place on remote Jolo Island and was aimed at capturing an Abu Sayyaf bomb-maker who is wanted by U.S. authorities. He is identified as Malaysian-born Zulkifli bin Hir, who goes by the alias Marwan. But a police spokesman said there was no sign of Marwan when the assault was over.

Among those killed was Gafur Jumdail, whose brother, Gumbahali Jumdail, is also on the U.S. State Department’s list of known terrorists.

The al-Qaida-linked Abu Sayyaf group is blamed for a years-long rebel campaign in the southern Philippines that has included bombings, kidnappings and beheadings.

http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2010/09/05/philippine-police-raid-leaves-3-militants-dead/

American soldiers helped Iraqi troops repell major attack in Baghdad

Jack Sinclair — Sun, 05 Sep 2010 21:58:17 +0000

Reporting from Baghdad —
“American soldiers helped Iraqi troops battle insurgents in downtown Baghdad on Sunday, repelling a major attack in the heart of the capital city five days after President Obama declared an end to U.S. combat operations.

At least 18 people were killed and 39 injured in the midday attack in which a group of suicide bombers and gunmen attempted to storm the Iraqi army’s headquarters for eastern Baghdad, located in a former Ministry of Defense building in a busy market district alongside the Tigris River.

No Americans were among the casualties, said military spokesman Lt Col. Eric Bloom.
“Soldiers living and working at Old MoD provided suppressive fire while IA [Iraqi army] soldiers located the two terrorists that entered the compound,” he said in an e-mail. The firefight lasted “a few minutes,” he said.”

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraq-attack-20100906,0,6013303.story

Glock Reliability: Your Carry Gun Must Be Completely Reliable

Jack Sinclair — Sun, 05 Sep 2010 03:45:45 +0000

Glock Ammo: Robert Boatman

Jack Sinclair — Sun, 05 Sep 2010 03:43:32 +0000

Faraday box: one way to protect sensitive electronics from EMP

Jack Sinclair — Sat, 04 Sep 2010 22:36:22 +0000

“A Faraday box is simply a metal box designed to divert and soak up the EMP. If the object placed in the box is insulated from the inside surface of the box, it will not be effected by the EMP travelling around the outside metal surface of the box. The Faraday box simple and cheap and often provides more protection to electrical components than “hardening” through circuit designs
which can’t be (or haven’t been) adequately tested.

Many containers are suitable for make-shift Faraday boxes: cake boxes, ammunition containers, metal filing cabinets, etc., etc., can all be used. Despite what you may have read or heard, these boxes do NOT have to be airtight due to the long wave length of EMP; boxes can be made of wire screen or other porous metal.

The only two requirements for protection with a Faraday box are: (1) the equipment inside the box does NOT touch the metal container (plastic, wadded paper, or cardboard can all be used to insulate it from the metal) and (2) the metal shield is continuous without any gaps between pieces or extra-large holes in it.

Grounding a Faraday box is NOT necessary and in some cases actually may be less than ideal. While EMP and lightning aren’t the “same animal”, a good example of how lack of grounding is a plus can be seen with some types of lightning strikes. Take, for example, a lightning strike on a flying airplane. The strike doesn’t fry the plane’s occupants because the metal shell of the plane is a Faraday box of sorts. Even though the plane, high over the earth, isn’t grounded it will sustain little damage.

In this case, much the same is true of small Faraday cages and EMP. Consequently, storage of equipment in Faraday boxes on wooden shelves or the like does NOT require that everything be grounded. (One note: theoretically non-grounded boxes might hold a slight charge of electricity; take some time and care before handling ungrounded boxes following a nuclear attack.)

The thickness of the metal shield around the Faraday box isn’t of much concern, either. This makes it possible to build protection “on the cheap” by simply using the cardboard packing box that equipment comes in along with aluminium foil. Just wrap the box with the aluminium foil (other metal foil or metal screen will also work); tape the foil in place and you’re done. Provided
it is kept dry, the cardboard will insulate the gear inside it from the foil; placing the foil-wrapped box inside a larger cardboard box is also wise to be sure the foil isn’t accidentally ripped anywhere. The result is an “instant” Faraday box with your equipment safely stored inside, ready for use following a nuclear war.

Copper or aluminium foil can help you insulate a whole room from EMP as well. Just paper the wall, ceiling and floor with metal foil. Ideally the floor is then covered with a false floor of wood or with heavy carpeting to insulate everything and everyone inside from the shield (and EMP). The only catch to this is that care must be taken NOT to allow electrical wiring connections to pierce the foil shield (i.e., no AC powered equipment or radio antennas can come into the room from outside). Care must also be taken that the door is covered with foil AND electrically connected to the shield with a wire and screws or some similar set up.

Many government civil defence shelters are now said to have gotten the Faraday box, “foil” treatment. These shelters are covered inside with metal foil and have metal screens which cover all air vents and are connected to the metal foil. Some of these shelters probably make use of new optical fibre systems–protected by plastic pipe–to “connect” communications gear inside the room to the “outside world” without creating a conduit for EMP energy to enter the shelter.

For larger items which cannot be boxed, such as living room TV sets, etc, I tape a Mylar space blanket to a piece of 6 mil black plastic sheet, using double-sticky tape every foot or so to make sure the Mylar stays in place (it is slippery). I leave a 2 inch edge of black plastic showing all around the space blanket, and while taping down the edges I put on a short lead of ground wire. When it appears that EMP or CME’s are on the way, the blanket can be draped over the appliance, the alligator clip attached to a small, unobtrusive ground wire behind the cabinet, and any electromagnetic radiation will be diverted to the ground wire. Very cheap, simple, and once done, items can be “draped” for protection very quickly indeed. The “EMP Blankets” roll up for storage, but can be unrolled and thrown over a TV/VCR setup, a computer/monitor combo, etc. As EMP comes from altitude and is line of sight, it’s OK that the bottom isn’t covered, as the bottom of the units sit on non conductive wood.

The time to build Faraday cages or blankets is NOW, as when they are actually needed it will be far too late. Each box should be labeled on the ends and the top for the exact appliance they were built for, to eliminate any confusion when they must be protected in a hurry. Any electrical appliances not in use should be stored in the Faraday cage, where they will be kept clean, neat, in a known location, and protected against any sudden EMP surge

NOTE: There are electrical engineers who say that only ferrous metal boxes will protect against EMP-enhanced weapons, while other sources say EMP is not a problem at all. I’ll take the middle ground.”

http://www.whenshtf.com/showthread.php?11095-EMP-Protection-and-Defences

Overview of Potential threat: Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack

Jack Sinclair — Sat, 04 Sep 2010 21:48:11 +0000

“If Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda — or the dictators of North Korea or Iran — had the ability to destroy America as a superpower, would they be tempted to try?

Wouldn’t that temptation be even greater if that result could be achieved with a single attack, involving just one nuclear weapon, perhaps even one of modest power and relatively unsophisticated design?

And, what if the attacker could be reasonably sure that the United States would not know who was responsible for such a devastating blow?

Unfortunately, that scenario is not far fetched. It is the conclusion of a report issued in 2004 by a blue ribbon commission created by Congress. The commission found that a single nuclear weapon, delivered by a ballistic missile to an altitude of a few hundred miles over the United States, would be “capable of causing catastrophe for the nation.”

How is that possible? By precipitating a lethal electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack.

An Atmospheric Tsunami

A nuclear weapon produces several different effects. The best known are the intense heat and hyperpressures associated with the fireball and the accompanying blast.

But a nuclear explosion also generates massive outputs of other kinds of energy. These include the creation of intense streams of x-rays and gamma-rays. If those are unleashed outside the earth’s atmosphere, some of them will interact with the air molecules of the upper atmosphere.

The result is an enormous pulsed current of high energy electrons that will interact, in turn, with the earth’s magnetic field.

In an instant, an invisible radio frequency wave is produced — a wave of almost unimaginably immense intensity, approximately a million times as strong as the most powerful radio signals on the earth. The energy of this pulse would reach everything in line of sight of the detonation. And it would do so at the speed of light.

The higher the altitude of the weapon’s detonation, the larger the affected area would be. At a height of three hundred miles, for example, the entire continental United States would be exposed, along with parts of Canada and Mexico.

In 2000, concerned about EMP technology, Congress created the “Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack” (the EMP Threat Commission, for short). In its final report, presented in summer 2004, the panel warned that terrorists could indeed execute such an attack by launching a small nuclear armed missile from a freighter off the coast of the United States.

… the testimony Congress received from other sources strongly suggested that such a devastating attack was neither unlikely nor difficult to achieve. It seemed that there was, in fact, reason to be concerned that terrorists and rogue states might present an EMP threat to the United States.

Concerned members of congress received help from an unlikely quarter in May 1999, when Russia explicitly invoked the specter of an EMP attack on the United States.

Vladimir Lukin (the chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee) assured a delegation of American legislators that Russia was not helpless in the face of U.S. led interventions:

Hypothetically, if Russia really wanted to hurt the United States in retaliation for NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia could fire a submarine launched ballistic missile and detonate a single nuclear warhead at high altitude over the United States. The resulting electromagnetic pulse would massively disrupt U.S. communications and computer systems, shutting down everything.

This blunt statement succeeded in getting the attention of both parties in Congress. A second opinion was clearly needed. And on October 30, 2000, the EMP Threat Commission was established by law.

The EMP Threat Today

The EMP Threat Commission conducted a worldwide survey of foreign scientific and military literature to assess the knowledge and intentions of foreign states regarding an EMP attack. The survey confirmed that both the physics and the military potential of EMP are indeed widely understood in the international community.

The commission survey found that the following nations were knowledgeable about EMP: China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia.

The commission also learned that some foreign military experts regard EMP attack as a form of electronic or information warfare, not primarily as a form of nuclear war. One of China’s leading military theorists has written:

Information war and traditional war have one thing in common, namely that the country which possesses the critical weapons such as atomic bombs will have “first strike” and “second strike retaliation” capabilities . . . .

As soon as its computer networks come under attack and are destroyed, the country will slip into a state of paralysis and the lives of its people will grind to a halt. (Su Tzu Yun, World War: The Third World War — Total Information Warfare, 2001.)

In Iran — the most unabashed state sponsor of international terrorism today — some theorists have argued that the key to defeating the United States lies in attacking its electronics. This is from an Iranian political military policy journal:

Once you confuse the enemy communication network, you can also disrupt the work of the enemy command and decision making center.

Even worse, today when you disable a country’s military high command through disruption of communications you will, in effect, disrupt all the affairs of that country. . . . If the world’s industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate within a few years. . . . American soldiers would not be able to find food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot. (“Electronics to Determine Fate of Future Wars,” Nashriyeh e Siasi Nezami, 1999.)

And this implied threat may not be empty words. In addition to their successful ship launched Scud missile test, the Iranian military has reportedly performed tests of its Shahab 3 medium range ballistic missile in a manner consistent with an EMP attack scenario.”

http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/05/front2453711.9284722223.html

A new device which may soon be on the market holds promise in allowing electronic equipment to be EMP hardened. Called the “Ovonic threshold device”, it has been created by Energy Conversion Devices of Troy, MI. The Ovonic threshold device is a solid-state switch capable of quickly opening a path to ground when a circuit receives a massive surge of EMP. Use of this or a similar device would assure survival of equipment during a massive surge of electricity.