- Comms
- Law
- Medic
- News
- Opinion
- Threat Watch
- Training
- Warrior Tools
- Accessories
- Ammo
- Body Armor
- Books
- Clothing
- Commo
- Gear
- Handguns
- Holsters
- Knives
- Long Guns
- ACC
- Accuracy International
- Barrett
- Benelli
- Beretta
- Blaser
- Bushmaster
- Custom
- CZ
- Desert Tactical Arms
- DPMS
- FN
- Forums
- HK
- IWI
- Kel-Tec Long Guns
- LaRue
- LWRC
- McMillan
- Mosin Nagant
- Mossberg
- Para
- Remington
- Rock River Arms
- Ruger Long Guns
- Sabre Defense
- Sako
- SIG Sauer
- SKS
- Smith & Wesson Long Guns
- Springfield
- Styer
- Weatherby
- Wilson Combat
- Winchester
- Magazines
- Maintenance
- Navigation
- Optics
- Sights
- Tech
- Warriors
Posts Tagged surge
“If Iraq is to teach us anything, it must be that a new idea cannot be beaten into a society.”
Posted by Jack Sinclair in News on 30/Aug/2010 22:45
“In the summer of 2006, Maj. Walt Cooper was convinced that his Special Forces team’s work was only contributing to the violence spiraling out of control in Baghdad.
Cooper and his soldiers were training a police battalion that took orders from a radical Shiite militia. “We know that the guys we train are some of the same dudes who are putting bullets in the back of people’s heads or going to work on them with power drills,” he wrote in a July 2006 e-mail home.
As the months passed, his cynicism and anger grew. “This place is now rotten to the core,” he concluded.
A year later Cooper was back in Iraq, working with 150-man police unit. His second tour, which coincided with a surge of about 30,000 American soldiers, almost felt like a different war. Violence dropped. Markets opened. Something resembling stability seemed to take hold. Cooper remembers his battle-scarred Iraqi police partner from that period as a brother in arms.”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/29/AR2010082903874.html
Why the Afghan surge probably will not succeed as well as the Iraq surge
Posted by Jack Sinclair in News on 17/Aug/2010 21:49
by Omar
“Afghans, while not necessarily fond of the Taliban actions, do not seem to see huge differences between Taliban and government control. In fact sometimes they prefer the former as the Taliban can be better at governance and creating working relations with the population, largely because the government is so incompetent and corrupt. Read the rest of this entry »
2 reasons why the Afghan situation is different from the Iraqi surge.
Posted by Jack Sinclair in News, Threat Watch on 25/Jun/2010 18:40
“…two major factors distinguish the Afghan from the Iraqi surge. First is the alarming weakness and ineptness — to say nothing of the corruption — of the Afghan central government. One of the reasons the U.S. offensive in Marja has faltered is that there is no Afghan “government in a box” to provide authority for territory that the U.S. military clears.
In Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, after many mixed signals, eventually showed that he could act as a competent national leader rather than a sectarian one when he attacked Moqtada al-Sadr’s stronghold in Basra, faced down the Mahdi Army in the other major cities in the south and took the fight into Sadr City in Baghdad itself. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, President Hamid Karzai makes public overtures to the Taliban, signaling that he is already hedging his bets.
But beyond indecision in Kabul, there is indecision in Washington. When the president of the United States announces the Afghan surge and, in the very next sentence, announces the date on which a U.S. withdrawal will begin, the Afghans — from president to peasant — take note.”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/24/AR2010062404870.html
The Meaning of Marjah
Posted by Brian in News, Threat Watch on 22/Feb/2010 18:01
“This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR”
By Kamran Bokhari, Peter Zeihan and Nathan Hughes
On Feb. 13, some 6,000 U.S. Marines, soldiers and Afghan National Army (ANA) troops launched a sustained assault on the town of Marjah in Helmand province. Until this latest offensive, the U.S. and NATO effort in Afghanistan had been constrained by other considerations, most notably Iraq. Western forces viewed the Afghan conflict as a matter of holding the line or pursuing targets of opportunity. But now, armed with larger forces and a new strategy, the war — the real war — has begun. The most recent offensive — dubbed Operation Moshtarak (“Moshtarak†is Dari for “togetherâ€) — is the largest joint U.S.-NATO-Afghan operation in history. It also is the first major offensive conducted by the first units deployed as part of the surge of 30,000 troops promised by U.S. President Barack Obama.
The United States originally entered Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks. In those days of fear and fury, American goals could be simply stated: A non-state actor — al Qaeda — had attacked the American homeland and needed to be destroyed. Al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan at the invitation of a near-state actor — the Taliban, which at the time were Afghanistan’s de facto governing force. Since the Taliban were unwilling to hand al Qaeda over, the United States attacked. By the end of the year, al Qaeda had relocated to neighboring Pakistan and the Taliban retreated into the arid, mountainous countryside in their southern heartland and began waging a guerrilla conflict. In time, American attention became split between searching for al Qaeda and clashing with the Taliban over control of Afghanistan. Read the rest of this entry »