Posts Tagged counterinsurgency

The End of Counterinsurgency and the Scalable Force

From STRATFOR:

By George Friedman

The U.S. military for years has debated the utility of counterinsurgency operations. Drawing from a sentiment that harkens back to the Vietnam War, many within the military have long opposed counterinsurgency operations. Others see counterinsurgency as the unavoidable future of U.S. warfare. The debate is between those who believe the purpose of a conventional military force is to defeat another conventional military force and those who believe conventional military conflicts increasingly will be replaced by conflicts more akin to recent counterinsurgency operations. In such conflicts, the purpose of a counterinsurgency is to transform an occupied society in order to undermine the insurgents.

Understanding this debate requires the understanding that counterinsurgency is not a type of warfare; it is one strategy by which a disproportionately powerful conventional force approaches asymmetric warfare. As its name implies, it is a response to an insurgency, a type of asymmetric conflict undertaken by small units with close links to the occupied population to defeat a larger conventional force. Insurgents typically are highly motivated — otherwise they collapse easily — and usually possess superior intelligence to a foreign occupational force. Small units operating with superior intelligence are able to evade more powerful conventional forces and can strike such forces at their own discretion. Insurgents are not expected to defeat the occupying force through direct military force. Rather, the assumption is that the occupying force has less interest in the outcome of the war than the insurgents and that over time, the inability to defeat the insurgency will compel the occupying force to withdraw. Read the rest of this entry »

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FET works with Now Zad District governor to improve, rebuild area

From: HQ ARRC

Female engagement team in Now Zad, Helmand province, Afghanistan

Maj. Aniela K. Szymanski, the Civil Affairs Group team leader in Now Zad, Helmand province, Afghanistan, greets the deputy district governor, Haji Saied Abdul Quyum, at his compound, April 8. The meeting between Szymanski, Marines with the Female Engagement Team, and the district governor, Saied Murad Sadat covered the growth of the Now Zad women’s center, the local schools and other upcoming community improvement plans.

Story and phots by Lance Cpl. Katherine M. SolanoSmall RSS Icon

CAMP LEATHERNECK, Afghanistan – The female engagement team in Now Zad, Helmand province, Afghanistan, is pushing for the speedy development of a women’s center, new school and other community projects.

In an effort to move the plans along, the Marines and their interpreter met with the district governor, Saied Mourad Sadat, at his compound, April 8.

They have made progress in the short time they have been here, but acknowledge there is still a long way to go.

“I wish things would work short term, but everything takes a long time to accomplish,” said Sgt. Habiba Abida, a team leader with FET 12, Now Zad. “It’s hard to give yourself deadlines for certain goals.”

The focus of the meeting was largely on the efficient development and management of the women’s center, but also on the female population in Now Zad as a whole.

“I’ve heard FET go and talk to females and ask what problems they have,” Sadat said. “Then [FET] comes and tells me what the women said so I can help, and it is positive for Now Zad and its people.”

Staff Sgt. Martha Warren, the staff non-commissioned officer in charge of the Regimental Combat Team 8 FETs, asked the district governor what specific problems women in his district were having.

“There is nothing for the widows,” Sadat replied. “We are in the process of getting [females with skills] to work and teach each other to provide for themselves.”

Warren, of Stone Park, Ill., also asked what specific impact FET was having on the local community.

“FET is a very good thing, because for the past five years with the war, lots of people have lost everything,” Sadat stated in response. “Females should know how to take care of themselves and their children.”

This is one of the main objectives of FET: to give women the skills and knowledge they need to make a living for themselves or to help support their husbands and families.

“Females are important, because a lot of families here are poor,” Sadat said. “Husbands go to the Taliban for work, but if the wives can teach husbands to work with the government instead of with people who are trying to destroy the country or villages, it will be good.”

They also discussed the hiring of a custodian for the women’s center, and how to teach local woman skills such as agriculture and sewing.

“I would love to say that by my first [mission break] I will have a full-time custodian at the women’s center, chickens for the coops, and sewing machines so the women could sew uniforms for Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan public schools,” said Abida, an Arlington, Va., native.

Abida felt that progress was made, and plans to meet in the near future to continue discussions were set. The district governor closed the meeting with an invitation for the FET Marines, and others with their unit, to join him for a dinner at his compound later that evening.

The dinner included a bonfire, traditional Afghan meal, music and hookah, but little talk of business. The dinner was more about a celebration of the growing working relationship between the Marines and the people of Now Zad.

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Countering Global Insurgency

From: Counterinsurgency by David Kilcullen

Countering Global Insurgency

Since the United States declared a global “war on terrorism” following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some analysts have argued that terrorism is merely a tactic, thus a war on terrorism makes little sense. Francis Fukuyama’s comment that ” the war on terror” is a misnomer… terrorism is only a means to an end; in this regard, a war on terrorism makes no more sense than a war on submarines” is typical. This view is irrelevant in a policy sense (the term “war on terrorism” is a political, not an analytical, expression) but nonetheless accurate. Indeed, to paraphrase Clausewitz, to wage this war effectively, we must understand its true nature: neither mistaking it for nor trying to turn it into something it is not. We must distinguish Al Qaeda and the broader militant movements it symbolizes—entities that use terrorism—from the tactic of terrorism itself. In practice, as I will demonstrate, the “war on terrorism” is a defensive war against a worldwide Islamist jihad, a diverse confederation of movements that uses terrorism as its principle—but not its sole—tactic.

– Excerpt from,  Counterinsurgency by David Kilcullen  -2010

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Counterinsurgency

Your company has just been warned for deployment on counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T. E. Lawrence, and Robert Thompson.  You have studied  FM 3–24 and now understand the history, philosophy, and theory of counterinsurgency. You have watched Black Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers, and you know this will be the most difficult challenge of your life.

But what does all the theory mean, at the company level? How do the principles translate into action—at night, with the GPS down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you don’t understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos? How does counterinsurgency actually happen?

– Excerpt from,  Counterinsurgency by David Kilcullen  -2010

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Counterinsurgency

This past weekend former Australian Army officer David Kilcullen was on C-SPAN talking about his new book Counterinsurgency.

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